15 March 2024
Last edited 17 December 2024

by Laurie Meadows

The Time Has Not Come

Defeat of NATO Defeat of US missile shield on Russia's border    The problem of 'too close'

Strategic non-nuclear weapons - the Oreshnik   How does the Oreshnik work?

Under what circumstances will Oreshnik be used?   Nuclear weapons now almost redundant

Russia's 'Big Picture' Security Interests

"I hope that everything that was said today would make any potential aggressor think twice, since unfriendly steps against Russia such as deploying missile defences and bringing NATO infrastructure closer to the Russian border become ineffective in military terms and entail unjustified costs, making them useless for those promoting these initiatives.

It was our duty to inform our partners of what I said here today under the international commitments Russia had subscribed to.

When the time comes, foreign and defence ministry experts will have many opportunities to discuss all these matters with them, if of course our partners so desire."
Vladimir Putin, March 01, 2018

"Today I submitted my own views, private views, to - called [Zda] weekly...- specifically devoted to the issue raised by President Joseph Biden on the 1st of August. And I said that the time has not come to tackle, to debate this issue in the present day situation.

But the present day situation is not in favor of starting such kind of talks devoted to new START treaty number 4. Military encounter in Ukraine, deployment of anti ballistic missile at operational bases in Romania...and soon will be operational in Poland, and we consider that this kind of facilities can be used for housing not only defensive or interceptor missiles, weapons, but also offensive, like land-based cruise missiles, nuclear tip, and in the future also hypersonic missile.

We ...in the Russian Federation...still living, while watching day in day out, ..the NATO airforce operation called 'Baltic air policing' in the airspace of 3 Baltic nations - Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, plus Poland ...This operation has dual capable aircraft, of all 3 nuclear western nuclear powers and we do not know what kind of air drop bomb this interceptor bombers of the United Kingdom, France and the United States...we do not know what kind of weapons they are carrying, because we can't send our inspectors because we have never conducted any negotiations whatsoever on this specific issue."
Dr. Vladimir Kozin, Professor of the Russian Academy of Military Sciences Oct 6, 2022

Difference between short and medium range missiles and intercontinental missiles Last edited 17 December 2024
Note: this article is mostly about InterContinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs), which is the major nuclear threat to both Russia and USA. Ground-based shorter to medium range missiles, whether ballistic or cruise, were not a factor, as their range was controlled by the Russia-USA Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF Treaty). Shorter range missiles, if they are nuclear tipped, are likely to have (relatively) less destructive power. The big problem with short and medium range missiles is that the time from launch to hitting the target is only minutes. There is no time to respond. Russia's command and control centers are, for historic reasons, within easy strike distance from medium range missiles deployed in Ukraine, Romania or Poland.

"You all remember well that the Soviet Union decided to liquidate ground-based medium-range missiles. The Americans did the same with their Pershings.

However, in addition to ground-based medium-range missiles, the Americans also had similar sea-based and air-based missile systems, while the Soviet Union did not. Therefore, it was, to a certain extent, unilateral disarmament on our part.

The potential enemy kept these systems at sea and in the air, and we gained nothing at all."
Vladimir Putin 16 December 2024

The United States of America saw this as a great feature, rather than a problem, because the Americans believed they were too far from Russia to ever have to be concerned about this class of missile. It turns out they were wrong. However, in 2019 the United States under President Trump unilaterally withdrew from the INF Treaty. This has opened Pandora's box. Post-2019 the USA accelerated its production of cruise missiles that exceeded the the previously restricted range, and Russia (as at June 2024) plans to do the same.

"...we consider it important to point out that it is absolutely incorrect to talk about Russia’s withdrawal from the INF Treaty. We did not take any action to withdraw.

The United States unilaterally withdrew from the treaty, which led to its termination. Russia, on the contrary, remained fully committed to it throughout the entire period of validity and, until the very last minute, made consistent efforts to keep the treaty alive.

We had come up with a number of initiatives to settle the existing counterclaims.

Once implemented, they could have saved the treaty.

It should also be kept in mind that Berlin insisted on us showing the 9M729 missile “if Russia has nothing to hide.” Specifically, Foreign Minister Heiko Maas told Sergey Lavrov this. However, when we organised a demonstration of the 9M729 missile, which went far beyond our obligations under the INF Treaty, German officials suddenly lost interest and never showed up. We believe this says a lot."
Russian Federation Information and Press Department 28 October 2020

Russia has unilaterally undertaken not to deploy short and medium range missiles so long as the USA does not first deploy such missiles in forward zones of Europe, Japan, South Korea or the Philippines. Of course, this class of missile is used by Russia in times of active conflict, for example in Ukraine.

"Equally concerning is the US activity in developing high-precision ground-based strike systems with a firing range of up to 5,500 km and preparing them for deployment in forward zones. Moreover, the transfer and deployment of these missile systems are already being prepared in Europe and the Asia-Pacific region.

Let me remind you that in the past, these measures were prohibited under the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, which ceased to be in effect at the initiative of the United States.

We have repeatedly stated that the termination of this treaty will have negative consequences for global security as a whole, while stressing that we will not deploy intermediate- and shorter-range missiles until American weapons of this kind appear in any region of the world.

In fact, Russia has taken on these obligations unilaterally. However, as I said, if the United States begins to deploy such systems, then all our voluntary restrictions will be lifted.

The USA is in the final stages of developing their first hypersonic missile (allegedly capable of speeds of around mach 3). It will probably be deployed around 2026. At the same time, it plans to deploy land-based cruise missiles in Germany 'episodically'. The technique the USA uses is to have overlapping 'episodes', such that in practice, the missiles are continuously deployed.

"During July’s Nato summit, the United States and Germany reached an agreement for the US to start what it referred to as “episodic deployments” of missiles in 2026. This will include Tomahawk cruise missiles, SM-6 ballistic missiles and a new generation of hypersonic systems currently under development. The main condition of the agreement is that none of these missiles will be equipped with nuclear warheads."
Christoph Bluth, The Conversation, 14 August 2024

On the 3rd of January 2021 I published an article titled 'The Time Has Come'. It covered the background to the destruction of the US - Russia balance of terror. That is, if there is ever a nuclear war 'mutually assured destruction' of both sides is certain (the concept is referred to as 'MAD'). If either side launched a nuclear attack on the other, the other side would detect it, and as 7,000 kilometers separate US and Russia, there would be time to launch a nuclear response. (Although there is only about 5 kilometers if you measure at the Russian eastern most island to Alaska's west coast, neither side hosts nuclear weapons there). A full response would probably end the world. As I said in the article, the Treaty both side had signed "ensured strategic balance, where neither side could win in a nuclear conflict."

The Anti Ballistic Missile Treaty signed by USA and Russia limited the numbers of anti ballistic missile complexes each side could have, and limited the number of anti-ballistic missiles in each site to 100. It was an additional means of arms control. If each side has only a limited number of defensive missiles, it removes the incentive for an arms race, where more and more nuclear ICBMs are built.

In that case, why did the USA wreck the Strategic Anti Ballistic Missile Treaty in 2002 by unilaterally withdrawing?

I noted in a further article in February 2022:

"In January 2022 the leaders of 5 nuclear weapons States made a joint affirmation that "a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought." They committed to progress nuclear disarmament, and, rather curiously, the ambiguous phrase "and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.” "

The New Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (which expires in 2026) is the very foundation of arms control. Russia and the USA have many issues to sort out before a new treaty can come into force.

Russian President Vladimir Putin announced on February 21 2023 that Russia was suspending its participation in the New START Treaty. Putin underscored that the decision does not mean a complete withdrawal and that a return to the accord remains possible under certain circumstances.

Addressing the Federal Assembly on February 21, President Vladimir Putin placed emphasis on NATO's intention to impose a strategic defeat on Russia amid its special military operation to demilitarize and de-Nazify Ukraine.

The Russian president also mentioned growing calls from the transatlantic alliance to allow on-the-ground inspections of the nation's nuclear sites. According to the president, these demands sound absurd, especially given that NATO specialists modernized and armed drones in order to attack Russia's Engels Air Base, home to part of the airborne contingent of Russia's nuclear triad, saying "And now they want to inspect our defense facilities. In the current conditions and today's confrontation, this simply sounds like some kind of nonsense."

"[The West] seeks to inflict a strategic defeat on us and to creep onto our nuclear sites. In connection with this, I am forced to announce today that Russia is suspending its participation in the New START Treaty. I repeat - not exiting from the treaty, but suspending its participation," Putin emphasized, adding that he had signed a decree to put new strategic ground-based complexes on combat duty.

Non-strategic nuclear forces

On 16 December 2024 President Putin re-emphasised that it was important to "keep non-strategic nuclear forces on constant alert and to continue holding exercises involving their potential use." The reason is obvious. The USA is planning on a 'boil-the-frog' slow and sly steps to bring hypersonic missiles into Germany and other countries neighbouring Russia.Then secretly arm them with nuclear warhead in order to allow the launch a 'Pearl Harbour' style sneak attack on Russia's military and civilian command and control, followed by massive attacks on Russia's strategic ICBM bases. This is done in the belief that the USA mainland will be immune from the same treatment.

Such thinking is delusional.

Defeat of NATO military forces First edited 17 December 2024

The Russian military action in Ukraine has shown that NATO and the US cannot defeat Russia on it's home ground, when acting in defense of Russian people.

Russian defensive military doctrine has, with one (temporary) exception, prevented forward move of the series of NATO trained and equipped armies into the Russian-speaking territories that Russia resolved to defend. Russia's air defense, electronic warfare, satellite based intelligence gathering, use of ever-improving drones of all sizes (including those with AI ability), superior air defenses, vast logistic base, mineral resource base, its ability to prevent opponents from controlling airspace, its superior air defense missiles, its ability to destroy Patriot and other air defense batteries, its immense artillery capability, its highly trained professional (and contract) soldiers, it's effective applied military doctrine - the list goes on and on - means it is an unbeatable land army in Europe. All armies that attack it, whether Napoleon's, Hitler's, or NATO's, will eventually be destroyed.

Whats more, the conflict has allowed Russia to thoroughly refine military doctrine, continuously improve all aspects of military command, logistics, services, equipment and training.

"Given the escalating geopolitical tensions, we must adopt additional measures to ensure the security of Russia and its allies. We are doing this carefully and thoughtfully, without becoming drawn into a full-scale arms race that would damage the socioeconomic development of the country.

We pay significant attention to improving the combat strength of the Armed Forces and increasing their capabilities. As part of these efforts, the Leningrad and Moscow military districts, as well as a number of new units and formations, have been created. The authorised strength of the Armed Forces has been increased to 1.5 million servicemen...this year, on average, over 1,000 men have been joining military service under contract every day...Last year, over 300,000 of our citizens, our men, came to military enlistment centres and signed contracts to serve in the Armed Forces – over 300,000.

This year, to date, the number has already exceeded 430,000, and this influx of volunteers shows no signs of stopping.

The army and navy are being re-equipped with up-to-date weapons and equipment at an accelerated pace. For example, the share of such weapons in the strategic nuclear forces has already reached 95 percent...

...The troops are receiving advanced robotic systems, including those using artificial intelligence technologies, such as reconnaissance and attack UAVs, unmanned boats and multi-purpose robotic platforms...

...strategic nuclear forces remain, without a doubt, a key tool for maintaining stability and protecting Russia’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. We will keep maintaining their potential and balanced growth, and continue working on creating new deterrent force systems and complexes.

...The most important task is to ensure the timely detection of the launch of such missiles [US/NATO short and intermediate range missiles] and to intercept them.

...it is necessary to streamline the serial production and the deployment of such domestically manufactured attack systems, including hypersonic systems.

it is necessary to more widely implement the experience gained during the special military operation into the combat training of troops, as well as into the higher military training institutions’ curricula.

Concurrently, it is necessary to improve the methods for conducting military operations, to update the fundamental statutory documents, and to raise the level of masterful use of weapons and equipment, as well as to increase the effectiveness of troop command and control, especially at the tactical and operational-tactical levels.

To reiterate, talented officers and non-commissioned officers who have proved themselves in difficult combat situations must join the core command staff of the Armed Forces and teach at military training institutions.

Fourth, the experience gained from conducting the special military operation should be fully considered when determining the priority areas for the development of domestic weapons and equipment, and the tactics for their use. For example, high-precision weapon systems employ new methods for guiding missiles at the end of their trajectory, enabling successful engagement against complex and fortified targets.

The interference immunity of onboard missile weapon systems has been significantly improved, and new methods of communicating flight missions have been tested. In the future, it is essential to identify targets in real-time, which is a crucial task for our military-industrial complex.

...to reduce the time required for decision-making in unit control on the battlefield, an inter-service information exchange system based on mobile devices has been created and has proven effective. Over 6,500 such systems have already been delivered to the troops. As a result of their use, the time taken for decision-making has decreased by 1.5 to 2 times.

It is now imperative to establish a unified information network that integrates reconnaissance and engagement capabilities at the strategic, operational and tactical levels of control, through the introduction of advanced developments in the military-industrial complex.

Today, several thousand drones of various types are being delivered to the troops each day. We must continue to enhance their combat and operational characteristics. It is equally important to train the operators of such systems under programmes developed based on the experience of real combat operations."
Vladimir Putin 16 December 2024

The huge numbers of men (nearly half a million in 2024 alone) joining the Russian military meant that by the end of 2024 the military had the potential to initiate a strategic break-through in many directions across the 1,000 kilometer line of contact. If Russia so chooses. It is Ukraine that must now constantly react to Russia's military initiatives.

"...Russian troops maintain a strong strategic initiative along the entire line of contact....Thanks to this commitment to the fate of their country and the future of their children, we have what I mentioned and what the Minister [of Defence Andrei Belousov] spoke about: in fact, this constitutes a break in the line of contact and our combat operations, a complete interception of the strategic initiative."
Vladimir Putin 16 December 2024

So much for the ability of the USA government and the West to bring the Russian Federation to it's knees. It hasn't happened, and it won't happen.

Defeat of US missile shield on Russia's border edited 8 July 2024

“…some time ago the United States unilaterally withdrew from the Anti-Missile Defence Treaty and started what amounts to undermining the fundamentals of international security. Yet another step has been made now. the US anti-missile deployment area is being created and was commissioned in Romania.
What is this? These are launch pads and radar stations.

Today, 500-kilometre range Iskander land-based missiles are being deployed; in a few years they will be 1000-kilometre range missiles. We even know the approximate date when such missiles will be deployed.

How can this not be a threat to us? It is a clear threat to our nuclear forces.

However, there is something else that is even worse: these compact launch pads can accommodate assault missiles with a 2,400-kilometre range, and replacing the missiles is no problem, one only has to change the software, and nobody is going to notice anything, even the Romanians. Isn’t it a threat to us? It certainly is.

That is the reason we have to respond now, and if yesterday some areas in Romania did not know what it is like to be a target, today we will have to take action to ensure our security. Let me repeat, these are response measures, a response only. We were not the first to take such steps.
Vladimir Putin 27 May 2016

"Today, 500-kilometre range Iskander land-based missiles are being deployed; in a few years they will be 1,000-kilometre range missiles. We even know the approximate date when such missiles will be deployed. ...You saw, the whole world saw our capabilities in terms of medium-range sea and air based missiles. We are not violating anything, but the Iskander land-based missile systems have a brilliant record"
Vladimir Putin 27 May 2016

At the time the Russian President made this comment, the INF Treaty was still in place. It prohibited ground-launched missiles with a range of over 500 kilometers. The range of the Iskander-M could be increased to 1,000 kilometers, but it could not be deployed in ground based systems. But it in principle could be built and not deployed. Clearly, the Russian President anticipated that when Russia announced the new unbeatable hypersonic weapons the US would 'officially' abandon the INF Treaty. He - rightly - assessed the US would compensate for the inferior speed of US tomahawk missiles by placing them hard up against the Russian border, initially close to the historic command and control centres in West Russia. For preference, right in the Crimean Peninsular. And build a US naval base right in there, allowing US permanent access to the Black Sea, and the threatening the Black Sea coastline with US submarines and surface ships. Which carry tomahawk cruise missiles tipped with tactical nuclear weapons.

The Russian military announced in 2016 that they were going to modernise the Iskander missile system, without giving details. The Iskander system alone has great potential to end military infrastructure of all kinds, as well as troop concentrations. It is mobile, relatively cheap, and very flexible. The Iskander complex can fire 2 missiles that travel at around mach 6-7 (hypersonic speed), either cruise (Iskander-K) or ballistic missiles (Iskander-M). They can be fitted with several type of warheads, from conventional munitions, bunker buster, cluster warheads to 'low' yield (5 to 50 kilotonnes) tactical nuclear warheads.

Once the US abandoned the INF treaty Russia would have a free hand to modernise not just the Iskander, but a whole suite of medium range missiles in order to reach every part of Europe - and the west coast of the USA. The USA, for its part, of course had long intended to ring Russia and China with just such land-based missiles, placed in Ukraine, Norway, Poland, Turkey, Iran, Afghanistan, the Central Asian 'stans', Mongolia, South Korea, Japan, Philippines, and China's Taiwan province. In order to 'contain' these two great countries.

The Russian President was simply warning Russia's expansion of medium range missiles would inevitably happen as a result of US actions, and by implication, that it would be better for the USA to eventually agree on a multi-country strategic weapons treaty. Part of the reason, of course, is that Russia's intermediate range missiles could conceivably be placed in Venezuela and other South or Central American countries. In the meantime, shorter range hypersonic missiles (with conventional warheads) are on Russian ships and submarines visiting Cuba, Venezuela and the Caribbean. The missiles they carry will now become much longer range, reaching deep into mainland USA.

And so it was.

On the 21 November 2024 Russia deployed the Oreshnik ('Hazel' in english) its newest unstoppable high precision hypersonic cruise missile. It, like others, covers all of Europe and the Mediterranean can be loaded with either conventional explosive or nuclear warheads. Its range is variously estimated as between 4,000 and 5,500 kilometers. If it was deployed in the Russian far east it could probably reach as far as North Dakota, Idaho and Nevada in the the USA. It is said to be mobile, so it will be hard to find and destroy, and has a relatively fast re-load time.

It has at least 6 re-entry vehicles (submunitions), and each re-entry vehicle can be independently targeted. The mode of action is uncertain. Some authorities say the re-entry submunitions skip across the top of the atmosphere on re-entry, much like skipping a stone on a pond. Another says the re-entry vehicles orient and aim after being released in space. They then descend at a steep angle, without further guidance or manouever. There are said to be 6 re-entry vehicles, and allegedly these 6 vehicles can launch a further 6 submunitions. This weapon can be used to destroy concrete bunkers deep in the ground, destroy airfields and aircraft on the ground, troop concentrations, and perform other military tasks.

Whatever the case, such configurations can do immense damage, even from the kinetic energy alone.

Russia is rightly concerned about the anti-ballistic missile shield placed in Poland and Romania, which, if effective, destroys strategic balance. The initial anti-ballistic missile shield covering non-existent nuclear missiles from Iran, a 'threat' which was the alleged basis for the anti-ballistic missile shield has morphed into a shield to allegedly protect Europe from Russian missiles. In fact, it is designed to protect mainland USA from Russian strategic ballistic missiles at the early stage of their launch, when they are traveling at their slowest. Russia had suggested cooperative anti-ballistic missile shields, which would have more or less ended the risk of nuclear weapons fired from relatively close off-shore and from static land-based strategic nuclear missiles.

The Russian President made this explicitly clear in 2019 when US tore up the INF Treaty.

"...the unilateral US withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty that, as we have always believed, and as I am still convinced, was the cornerstone of the entire international security system.

We debated this matter for a long time, argued and suggested various solutions. In any event, I made very energetic attempts to convince our US partners not to withdraw from the Treaty.

And, if the US side still wanted to withdraw from the Treaty, it should have done so in such a way as to guarantee international security for a long historical period.

I suggested this, I have already discussed this in public, and I repeat that I did this because I consider this matter to be very important.

I suggested working jointly on missile-defence projects that should have involved the United States, Russia and Europe. They stipulated specific parameters of this cooperation, determined dangerous missile approaches and envisioned technology exchanges, the elaboration of decision-making mechanisms, etc. Those were absolutely specific proposals.

I am convinced that the world would be a different place today, had our US partners accepted this proposal.

Unfortunately, this did not happen.

We can see that the situation is developing in another direction; new weapons and cutting-edge military technology are coming to the fore. Well, this is not our choice."
Vladimir Putin 27 June 2019

... We have introduced a new postulate on it being possible to use the Armed Forces not only to rebuff but also prevent an armed attack on Russia or its allies, if this armed attack is absolutely inevitable.

Thereby we unequivocally let potential aggressors know that Russia will resolutely defend its right and the right of our allies to free and safe development."
Sergey Lavrov 19 June 2023

In other words, in case of an armed attack on Russia being inevitable, even before open conflict erupts, Russia's cutting edge, unstoppable, manoeuvering hypersonic conventional missiles, fired from sea or land, will destroy the anti-ballistic missile systems in Romania, Poland, and wherever they are installed. The Oreshnik alone has simply rendered all of the US and European 'missile shields' useless.

"It goes without saying that when choosing, if necessary and as a retaliatory measure, targets to be hit by systems such as Oreshnik on Ukrainian territory, we will in advance suggest that civilians and citizens of friendly countries residing in those areas leave danger zones. We will do so for humanitarian reasons, openly and publicly, without fear of counter-moves coming from the enemy, who will also be receiving this information.

Why without fear? Because there are no means of countering such weapons today.

Missiles attack targets at a speed of Mach 10, which is 2.5 to 3 kilometres per second.

Air defence systems currently available in the world and missile defence systems being created by the Americans in Europe cannot intercept such missiles.

It is impossible.

I would like to emphasise once again that it was not Russia, but the United States that destroyed the international security system and, by continuing to fight, cling to its hegemony, they are pushing the whole world into a global conflict.

We have always preferred and are ready now to resolve all disputes by peaceful means. But we are also ready for any turn of events.
If anyone still doubts this, make no mistake: there will always be a response."
Vladimir Putin 21 November 2024

Most likely all nuclear capable NATO bombers and nuclear capable fighters within strike range of Russia will be destroyed at the same time. Destroyed early and either with or without warning. Checkmate. Defeated. All that money wasted. And it didn't have to be this way.

Defeat of the US attempt to destroy the strategic nuclear balance

USA and NATO Anti ballistic missile curtain on Russia's border

"They [USA] are using various far-fetched pretexts to deploy ground-based anti-missile systems in close proximity to Russian borders.

Projects are rapidly unfolding to develop marine vessels, which regularly appear near the Russian coast.

The United States is also implementing plans to develop the space segment of its global missile defence system, which actually envisages the deployment of anti-missile strike weapons in space in the future.

In addition, in the context of their missile defence efforts, Washington included, at the doctrinal level, the possibility of carrying out “disarming” strikes against the missile capabilities of those countries that the United States considers to be its adversaries.
It should be understood that attempts to present the global missile defence system as a purely defensive project are nothing more than a smoke screen. By building up its anti-missile capabilities, the United States mainly seeks to gain a decisive advantage by creating conditions for dealing the first strike to the enemy and protecting itself from retaliatory actions. This can and is already leading to serious consequences in the security sphere. It is upsetting the strategic balance of power in the world and spurring an arms race, including missiles..

For our part, we intend to act in accordance with the task set by the President of Russia to ensure a conflict-free coexistence by maintaining the balance of power and strategic stability.

In our dialogue with Washington on this track, we promote the concept of a comprehensive review of factors affecting strategic stability, embracing all weapons capable of solving strategic problems – nuclear and conventional, offensive and defensive. At the same time, when we discuss strategic defensive systems, we primarily mean due consideration of the missile defence factor.."
Foreign Ministry Spokeswoman Maria Zakharova 3 May 2021

Russia can use air launched long range hypersonic missiles to easily destroy US surface ships carrying the aegis system. Using conventional munitions. The Kinzhal, for example is likely to be deployed with every squadron of MiG-31K in Russia, including coastal squadrons. The MiG-31K -Kinzhal combination has a combined strike reach of 3,000 kilometers. Any NATO vessel that penetrates that radius will be destroyed, all hands on board - and all missiles - lost. In essence, Russia can now easily deal with the USA anti ballistic missile system out to 3,000 kilometers from its border. There is no real need for Russia to seek negotiations on it (bearing in mind that the USA has proven to be incapable of keeping its word anyway).

The problem of too close

But Russia can't simply attack and destroy all hostile country sea and land-based anti-ballistic-missile systems because they 'too close' to Russia's border. Well, actually, they physically can, but at this stage, at least, they choose not to.

"...the last time a credible military threat was placed near the border of the United States, the US responded so aggressively that it almost ended the world....the fact that people who think Russia and China should tolerate US actions on their borders that the US would never tolerate on its own borders actually believe the United States should rule the world. ...the only reason we survived that perilous standoff was because Washington made compromises and pulled its Jupiter missiles out of Turkey and Italy.

...the Cuban Missile Crisis shows how aggressively the US will respond to a foreign rival placing a military threat near its border....

...the single dumbest thing the US empire asks us to believe is that its amassing of war machinery near the borders of its top two geopolitical rivals should be seen as a defensive measure, rather than the act of extreme aggression that it obviously is..."
Caitlin Johnstone 27 August 2023

In contrast, the United States astonishingly aggressive and dangerous confrontation with the Soviet Union over Soviet missiles in Cuba shows that even in the 1960's 725 kilometers is unacceptably close. The distance from Cuba to Florida is about 725 kilometers (about 500 miles). The Jupiter intermediate range ballistic missiles that the USA placed in Turkey could easily reach Moscow. But at the time the USA had an overwhelming advantage in number of nuclear warheads and dellivery platforms. And, while it made political difference to Kennedy, the deployment made no strategic military difference. The US governments counterstrike potential from its greater number of submarines off the Russian coast meant that Russian missiles in Cuba were more symbolic than threatening. Whats more, western European countries were living as close, or closer to Soviet intermediate range nuclear missiles.

Looked at this way, US nuclear missiles 'close' to Russia do not alter the strategic balance.

But a large proliferation of missiles on NATO country fighter bombers close to the Russian border, while they don't alter the strategic balance, do alter the odds of a nuclear accident. Massively.

Strategic Nuclear Missiles edited 3 September 2024

"The US Compliance Report again reads that the United States fully complies with its commitments under the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START). As before, we have no grounds to agree with this. Washington unilaterally withdrew a hundred strategic offensive arms from counting under the Treaty, and this problem remains outstanding. Let's recall the gist of this problem.

By February 5, 2018, Russia and the United States were supposed to reduce the aggregate numbers of these arms to the levels set out in Article II of the Treaty and not to increase them subsequently.

Russia fully complied with its commitment, which the US recognised. We cannot confirm that the US did this as well.

According to the United States, its aggregate level of deployed and non-deployed heavy bombers and strategic missile launchers amounts to 800, but in reality this number is much bigger. Washington did not count 56 submarine ballistic missile launchers and 41 B-52H heavy bombers. It claims that they were converted into a conventional-only role.

Russia is not able to verify the US “conversion”, as is envisaged by Item 3, Section I of Part Three of the New START Treaty’s Protocol.

In addition, the US does not count four silo launchers designed for training and tries to justify this by putting them into the category of silo training launchers that are not covered by the Treaty.

This US-created problem obviously undermines the Treaty and directly affects the prospects for extending it. A search for ways to resolve this problem has been futile so far.

We will continue trying to prevent the US from gaining unilateral advantages and to compel it to fully comply with all of the Treaty’s commitments.

After Washington destroyed the INF Treaty, New START is the last international treaty to limit the Russian and US nuclear missile potentials and to make activities in this area predictable and mutually verifiable."
Russia Ministry of Foreign Affairs Statement 20 September 2019

"We, including the President, have repeatedly stated that Russia’s security is reliably ensured for decades to come.

The United States and its NATO allies are aware of that.

But the effectiveness of ensuring national security will only benefit from efficient and working mechanisms in the sphere of arms control.

The amounts spent on this work can be streamlined, if we choose to use this language.

In political and diplomatic terms, predictability and understanding of what we can expect from our opponents in terms of their capabilities will sharply decrease in the absence of the treaty.

Of course, what the US analysts point out as positive aspects of the New START Treaty – transparency and predictability – is important for us as well. Truth be told, a treaty built on parity and a balance of interests will do the same for us.

Even without the treaty, we will work to strengthen security and address issues, including political and diplomatic issues, through other means. As I mentioned earlier, it will be harder to do without it."
Deputy Foreign Minister Sergey Ryabkov 6 March 2020

"...we cannot understand what they mean when they say that the treaty [the START Treaty] does not cover the latest Russian weapons, and that the renewal depends on the solution of this ‘problem.’ The treaty cannot be rewritten. If anybody wanted to do this, it would be a completely different document...

...Bringing up China is a huge political challenge and a very complicated, large issue. Even in terms of the working procedures and diplomacy it is an infeasible task.

We agree with China that before trying to reach some dubious and hard-to-reach goals, it is better to begin with the preservation of what is already there. A bird in the hand is worth two in the bush.

Had we received a note in response saying that “the United States is ready to renew the treaty if
a) the People’s Republic of China becomes a party, and
b) specific provisions are added to the text, we would have answered that extending the treaty under these terms would be impossible in view of the reasons that I have already mentioned.

We cannot fulfil these conditions just for the sake of pleasing the Americans."
Let me say a few more words on this subject. Regarding Russia’s new arms systems, we have told the Americans on multiple occasions that two of them, i.e., Avangard and Sarmat, can be included in the treaty. We have already shown one of them to the Americans.

As for the other three, we are open to discussing this matter, but only as part of a conversation on the whole range of questions relating to ensuring strategic stability.

In this sphere, we have to primarily focus on US programmes and projects that are a matter of concern for us.

This includes the US global anti-missile defence, the prospects of US deploying offensive weapons in space, the prompt global strike programme, and many other questions.

The imbalance in conventional weapons is also a factor for us.

It would be impossible to come to a common denominator on matters of strategic stability without taking these questions into consideration.

The Americans refuse to listen to us when we try explaining why this matters.

They adopted an arrogant and mentoring tone, claiming that from now on the United States will discuss arms control only when decisions help strengthen its own security, as if they have ever acted differently, or we thought of anything other than ensuring our national security in the process.

Let me reiterate that we do not really understand whether the Americans are interested in keeping arms control in place as a means of ensuring security.

Deputy Foreign Minister Sergey Ryabkov 17 April 2020

Russia has advanced new weapons systems such as the Peresvet laser-weapon in development, it has the extremely advanced S-500 anti-missile system (claimed to be capable of intercepting even some of Russia's own hypersonic missiles, and able to reach up into space to attack satellites). These are conventional, not strategic systems. But Russia's hypersonic missiles can carry nuclear warheads instead of conventional warheads.

The RS-28 Sarmat is a massive intercontinental ballistic missile with a range of 18,000 kilometers that (if launched into space for a period) can travel 35,000 kilometers, circling around the globe and attack USA from any direction, and thereby avoiding US anti-ballistic missiles systems. The Sarmat can also carry the Avangard Hypersonic Glide Vehicle which, apart from its incredible re-entry speed (up to mach 27), can manouver from side to side and up and down, making it impossible to shoot down. Then there is the Poseidon nuclear torpedo. It does not fall under the START treaty at all. Russia is building hypersonic missile equipped smaller naval vessels that can patrol far enough from the USA coast to avoid current anti-ship missiles, but still easily with hypersonic missile strike range.

The unstoppable Oreshnik hypersonic missile can reach anti missile defences in Alaska and California, and probably reach North Dakota where USA strategic nuclear missile forces are located. The Oreshnik is unperturbed by missile defenses, but it can be used to eliminate them, clearing the path for other Russian conventionally armed hypersonic missiles to strike USA.

Strategic non-nuclear weapons - the Oreshnik Added 30 November 2024

Note: this is largely a copy of the information in my 'Coercive Diplomacy' article.

Reach
As at end 2024 the Oreshnik system has limited reach, maybe 4,000 kilometers. It can reach limited parts of the US west coast - including the US strategic missile deployment site in North Dakota- if launched from the far east of Russia. But if the US forces a showdown via some strike into Russia, the reply will probably use the Oreshnik. There is, however, a possibility it could be shot down.

Defense against Oreshnik
In certain circumstances, the Oreshnik hypersonic ballistic missile system can be challenged by the US-Israeli Arrow 3 anti-ballistic missile system. (Which is really a 'forward deployed' anti-ballistic missile for the defense of the USA - not Israel - against a future Iranian nuclear ICBM. Israel is more or less directly on the 5,000 kilometer long flight path of Iranian missiles traveling to the USA east coast. As at 2024 Iran's longest range missile has a range of only 2,000 kilometers, but that will increase with time.)

But the Oreshnik can be destroyed in space only if the Arrow 3 system is installed in the west Alaskan coast, and the Russians launched the Oreshnik within range of an Alaska deployed Arrow. That is, anywhere from the middle of Russia across to far eastern Russia. The western part of Russia is too far away from western USA for the current range of the Oreshnik to reach. But the US can hardly relax.

Here is the danger for the US if it insolently attacks Russia: ultimately, variants of the Oreshnik system may use one of Russia's long distance Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (their range is around 11,000 kilometers) rather than missile booster rockets of shorter range. A long range ICBM booster rocket will easily enable the Oreshnik to reach anything in the whole continental USA. How so?. Because if the ICBM is fired from the middle of Russia and the Orenshnik re-entry vehicles are released at the 4,000 kilometers apogee of their 8,000 kilometer journey, the re-entry arc could take them as far as New York State.

The US-Israeli Arrow 3 is the only anti ballistic missile system that has a hope of hitting the missile at the moment of apogee in space. The apogee is the point in space when the launch missile slows and releases its re-entry munitions. They then orient themselves, lock onto the ultimate target, and start accelerating back to earth. The Arrow has a maximum range of 2,400 kilometers. But that means the re-entry vehicles are already accelerating to their target by the time they are within range and going too fast for the Arrow 3 to hit. Yes, the Arrow 3 can cover east Russia, but it simply cannot stop a long range Orenshnik launched from mid or west Russia.

If such a long range variant is developed - it won't be that difficult - Russia will be able to destroy the American factory that makes the long range cruise missiles fired by Ukraine against Russia using the Oreshnik's conventionally armed re-entry warheads. Conventionally armed, not nuclear.

How does the Oreshnik work? Added 6 December 2024 Edited 8 December 2024
The Oreshnik ICBM releases its multiple warheads in space, at the top of ascent. The warheads (allegedly 36 in the November 2024 attack) orient themselves to their individual target, and speed down on it "like a meteorite" - as the Russian President put it when he introduced the first hypersonic weapons to the world in 2018.

Experts believe that the Oreshnik "impact components" were made from metallurgical materials containing elemental compounds ("appropriate elements") capable of withstanding great heat. In the Reagan era, the Americans toyed with the idea of placing 'rods from God' made from tungsten on satellites. These were to be propelled down onto the enemy below, with the combination of velocity and mass creating massive force at impact. The problem was, allegedly, that to create the required impact, very large projectiles would be needed, which are very heavy to hoist into orbit. The solution later suggested was the less weighty and unwieldy 'hypervelocity rod bundles', which used solid tungsten metal rods about 6 meters long and 30 centimeters wide. The weight of such rods was about 8 tons, but the damage potential was similar to a conventional bomb of a similar weight. In spite of the advantage of very fast launch time, it was possibly not cost-effective. Tungsten is heavy and is so heat resistant (practically impossible to melt and pour liquid metal castings) that 'tungsten' material have to be made from a blend of powdered tungsten and some other metal.

According to Professor Postol, such objects arriving at very high hypervelocity speeds collapse into themselves and release immense heat of phase change before they have a chance to penetrate deep into the earth. He says they have to 'slow' slightly, perhaps to Mach 10, to avoid the mass being used up 'early' and failing to penetrate deeply. An article published by Mike Mihajlovic on 24 November 2024 discusses the TNT equivalent of various weights of strike vehicles traveling at various speeds. Even a relatively 'light' 100kg vehicle has the explosive energy of about 1 metric tonne of TNT. His estimates are based on a 2017 US RAND paper (pdf) on the threat posed by hypersonic weapons.

"When a hypervelocity impact occurs, the impactor compresses, sending a shock wave into the surrounding rocks. The shock waves also pass through the impactor itself, and as the wave passes through it, the impactor experiences a significant amount of pressure. When the shock wave reaches the upper surface of the projectile, it is reflected as a tensional wave or rarefaction wave. This reflected wave releases or unloads the built-up pressure from the shockwave—the release of pressure results in a rapid release of energy that melts or vaporizes the projectile."
Mike Mihajlovic 'Oreshnik enters the chat' 24 November 2024

For this reason, tungsten is likely to be used in the Oreshnik.

"Concerning strike capabilities, I have already addressed this. If we deploy multiple such systems simultaneously in a single strike – say, two, three, or four systems – it would be comparable in force to the use of nuclear weapons, albeit they are not nuclear. This is because they are: a) high-precision; b) not equipped with a nuclear explosive device, thus they do not cause environmental contamination. Yet, the force would be comparable.
Regarding the presence of explosives, I reiterate: this is why testing is conducted, to determine what requires further development. There is no great secret here; experts will readily grasp what I am referring to. When I speak of improvement, it primarily concerns the balance between range and warhead.

The greater the range, the smaller the warhead; conversely, the shorter the range, the more potent the warhead. The system is capable of lifting a greater payload in this scenario, that’s the crux of it.

For targets at varying distances, different missile types are required, or at least, distinct configurations of these missiles, specifically the warhead equipment. This is an area requiring attention. It is not a straightforward task, and it will likely necessitate additional research and development work, etc.

As for the missile we utilised, the appropriate elements were employed as the impact components, and they serve as damage agents as well.

As I have mentioned, these are quite potent elements that are heated to a temperature of 4,000 degrees. If I am not mistaken, (you can check online), the surface of the Sun is approximately 5,600–6,000 degrees, making it comparable to solar surface temperatures.

A kinetic impact is a formidable force, akin to a meteorite impact. History has shown us the effects and consequences of meteorite impacts. They have been sufficient to create entire lakes, have they not? Consider the Tunguska event and its outcomes.

Similarly here, the damage is substantial: everything at the centre is reduced to ash, breaking down into its elemental components, and objects located at a depth of three or four, possibly even more, floors below are affected. These are fortified structures, not merely floors. The impact force is immense. Of course, more can be added to amplify the effect.

The key point is that the functional sample has been created, it functions as intended by its designers. It is a high-precision and high-power weapon."
Vladimir Putin 28 November 2024

The material composition used in the submunitions is clearly one of the keys to creating creating sufficient destructive 'yield'. The USA (and other major technologically advanced countries) have been researching novel materials such as a boron-carbide element that is extremely hard and is able to withstand extreme pressures and temperatures. But these elements are much lighter than tungsten. It is tempting to consider the novel elements might be blended with tungsten to increase the mass. Some novel compound element like this or boron nitride (which only melts at temperatures over 5,000^oC), would survive the high temperatures of entry through the earths atmosphere. Boron nitride is somewhat similar in properties to diamonds. Experiments on diamonds exposed to a directional shock show that downward shock waves propagate through structural flaws in the diamond, which creates a cascading wave of further flaws.

Perhaps this principle, or something similar, has been employed, using tungsten perhaps blended with an element similar to boron nitride, with the shock being provided by the shock of impact. As the Russians claim the impact releases of huge amounts of heat, this might conceivably be the result of the vaporisation of such normally melt-resistant compounds. Perhaps the earthquake-like effect is caused by the downward propagation of the high velocity energy 'sound' wave coupled with the following seismic 'liquifaction' of the earth.

"No one else in the world has such weapons yet, as we and you know. Indeed, sooner or later other leading countries will have them, we know what kind of designs are being worked on there. However, it will be tomorrow, or in a year or two. Meanwhile, we have this system today. And this is essential."
Vladimir Putin 22 November 2024

Tungsten itself is highly heat resistant. The US surely knows the physics of how to accelerate a heat resistant low-drag object through the atmosphere to hit the ground at around mach 10. They must be able to do what Russia has already done. It seems the problem is not so much how to do it, but one of materials composition sufficient to survive extreme speed travel through atmospheric friction.

The Russian President is very confident that others will develop a system similar to the Oreshnik. He claims Russia knows the general designs being investigated. Well, there is quite a bit of public scientific literature on novel heat resistant materials and what happens to them under great pressure, so it seems obvious scientists of the major countries would work on them, and probably have been working on them ever since the 'rods of God' days. President Putin was well aware of the damage potential of the 'rods of God' idea even as early as 2007. He hinted at it, and specified the targeting in a comment in 2007 when discussing his idea of a cooperative major power joint early warning radar system.

"The interceptors could also be deployed on mobile platforms, on military vessels, for example...

...It would also have the advantage of providing a missile defence shield for all rather than just a part of Europe. This is because such a system would be able to intercept and destroy missiles fired at European territory during the first stage of the trajectory, and this, in addition, means that the remains of destroyed missiles would fall not on European cities but into the sea.

This is a serious matter because hunks of metal up to 30 centimetres across can not just punch a hole in the roof, but if they are falling at great speed, could rip through a five or seven storey building right down to the basement, and this is no joking matter."
Vladimir Putin 8 June 2007

Coincidentally prescient, or a warning?

According to President Putin, looking ahead, the genie is out of the bottle. The China and the US will have this weapon, maybe India, maybe Iran. On 2 December 2024 the US confirmed it will not field a hypersonic weapon until 2025 at the earliest. This seems to confirm the Russian Presidents prediction.

"Experts disagree on the potential impact of competitor hypersonic weapons on both strategic stability and the U.S. military’s competitive advantage. Nevertheless, former Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering (USD[R&E]) Michael Griffin has testified to Congress that the United States does not “have systems which can hold [China and Russia] at risk in a corresponding manner, and we don’t have defenses against [their] systems.”2

Although the John S. McCain National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019 (FY2019 NDAA, P.L. 115-232) accelerated the development of hypersonic weapons, which USD (R&E) identifies as a priority research and development area, the United States is unlikely to field an operational system before FY2025."
Hypersonic Weapons:Background and Issues for Congress 2 December 2024, Sam LaGrone (U.S. Naval Institute)

Perhaps new technologies involving Hydrogen-boron fusion will be developed. In any event, new when married to precision hypersonic strike vehicles launched by ballistic missiles, the purpose of so-called 'low yield' nuclear weapons disappears. Further development of the Oreshnik and Russia's other hypersonic missiles, taken as a 'suite of options' for any purpose, is an absolutely effective deterrence package.

Under what circumstances will Oreshnik be used? Edited 15 December 2024

This weapon will be used to react to aggressions against Russia. By any country. It will not be used as an offensive weapon. Russia showed restraint in its military response to the NATO proxy attempt to bring down the Russian government. Its advance across the disputed territories is characterised by a slow, grinding roll forward. Why? In part because it has been working to finish development of the Oreshnik and put it into deployment. Russia knew that it could slowly eat up the Ukrainian military and destroy a lot of NATO armaments over time, and, as Sergey Lavrov put it, they "are not in a hurry". Destruction of all Ukrainian sectors - military, power, power distribution, oil facilities, gas storage etc has been linked to Ukrainian attacks on undisputed Russian territory. These are retaliatory measures designed to force Ukraine to agree to terms. Russia will inevitably have economic relations with Ukraine in the long run. It is counterproductive to Russia's long term interests in peace and stability to 'Oreshnik everything' to a pile of ash.

"You mentioned toughening the nuclear doctrine. We are not toughening the nuclear doctrine. We are upgrading it.

And generally speaking, we need to improve Oreshnik rather than the nuclear doctrine.

When you think about it, the advancement of modern weapon systems has almost eliminated the necessity for the use of nuclear weapons.

This is why we are rather careful across all sectors. I would even say we are restrained. But where it is necessary, we show the will at the state level..."
Vladimir Putin 10 December 2024

"We consider ourselves entitled to use our weapons against military facilities of those countries that allow to use their weapons against our facilities, and in case of an escalation of aggressive actions, we will respond decisively and in mirror-like manner.

I recommend that the ruling elites of the countries that are hatching plans to use their military contingents against Russia seriously consider this."
Vladimir Putin 21 November 2024

When appropriate, it will be used against Ukraine if it attacks "critical assets" in undisputed Russian territory.

"...we do not rule out the combat employment of Oreshnik on military-industrial facilities or command centres, including those in Kiev. We remain cognisant that the Kiev authorities continue their attempts to target our critical assets, including those in St. Petersburg and Moscow."
28 November 2024

The characteristics that make it perfect in 'active' military coercion are:

When used alone or in conjunction with other conventionally armed hypersonic weapons it can deliver just the needed amount of force to mirror the initial insult. Not too much, not too little. The Oreshnik will not be used when the same result can be achieved with cheaper conventional weapons.

"For instance, it would be futile to target a minor objective with a hypersonic missile, akin to “using a sledgehammer to crack a nut.”
However, we will utilise our entire arsenal against significant targets."
Vladimir Putin 28 November 2024

It allows a range of military force types to be delivered - surface acting munitions against concentrations of manpower and war material, barometric munitions for use where forces are hiding in rubble, ground-liquifying penetrating elemental force to break through concrete bunkers and penetrate deep into heavily re-inforced undergound fortifications, and so on.

It lowers the threshold of use because there is nothing the enemy can do to stop it
It is relatively cheap
It is entirely indigenously made
There is a well trained and experienced production pipeline well protected deep inside Russia
Operators are already trained
There will be a very rapid improvement cycle
It cannot be stopped by any missile defense system
Because it can't be stopped, there is an opportunity for people from friendly countries to be told to leave by a certain date or hour.

"we will in advance suggest that civilians and citizens of friendly countries residing in those areas leave danger zones."
Vladimir Putin 21 November 2024

The threat of further mirror strikes is absolutely credible. Russia can strike anything and anyone is chooses, when it chooses.
The strike on the USA target can be launched from within Russia's border.
It is well known that Russian doctrine includes the principle of not only providing a mirror response, but where the aggression in unprovoked - as it always is in the case of the USA 'elite' thugs - then those military officers who ordered the strike and those who carried out the order are targeted.
In the case of an unprovoked aggression a punitive (rather than mirror) counterstrike may be needed. The flexibility of these hypersonic weapons systems are such that the 'dial' for this can be set to any level and type at all.
The entire Russian nation is configured to operate in wartime conditions, economically, culturally, psychologically.

Russia can use the Oreshnik and other hypersonic systems knowing costs are in hand. Russia is unlikely to be economically exhausted by a war. The entire world runs on cheap energy, and Russia has a lot of it - in state majority-owned hands. And in the extreme case, as Russia has almost no trade with the continental USA, there is no economic reason not to strike mainland USA with hypersonic weapons such as the Oreshnik if the US enables strikes deep in Russia - or on any critical defense means anywhere..

Oreshnik overdominance means nuclear weapons will be used Edited 27 November 2024

When the Oreshnik was demonstrated in use on 21 November 2024, various American current and former military people proclaimed that because its dominant nature, the Oreshnik nullified all the land, sea and air military potential of NATO. Therefore, the USA, having nothing to match it, will have to use nuclear weapons in a conflict with Russia. Several high level American figures went further, saying the USA had to make a preemptive nuclear strike on Russia. If Russia considered there was even the smallest chance USA would in fact do this, then logically they would be compelled to launch an immediate crippling nuclear attack on USA to preempt the preemption. Fortunately for the world, at the moment, Russia does not believe this US rhetoric. This rhetoric is thoughtless, impulsive, and child-like. In principle it is dangerous, and should be done. But this just a crude attempt at political coercion.

America will not strike Russia with strategic nuclear weapons.

Russia will not strike USA with strategic nuclear weapons.

To do so would mean the end of the world. With no world, there is no economic gain. And most conflicts are, at root, about economic gain.

If the massively powerful silo-based strategic intercontinental ballistic missile nuclear weapons can't be used, that leaves American preemptive strikes on Russia with tactical nuclear weapons. Their destructive power is still enormous, and can be dial-selected from 'low' yield enormous to 'mid range' yield enormous. They are intended to destroy troop concentrations, military staff headquarters, military ports and other large military targets. The USA plans to station nuclear capable cruise missiles in Germany in 2026. The USA would like to use the hands of their German proxy to launch them. Would the USA really use nuclear weapons for a preemptive 'decapitating' strike on the Russian command? I don't think so.

First, a preemptive strike is by definition an unprovoked aggression. It is illegal. This is the worst possible war crime against a people, according to the judges of the Nuremburg trial.

"To initiate a war of aggression, therefore, is not only an international crime; it is the supreme international crime differing only from other war crimes in that it contains within itself the accumulated evil of the whole"
See 22 Trial of the Major War Criminals Before the International Military Tribunal 427 (1948)

All those involved, both German and American, would automatically become war criminals, and liable to be hung on conviction. Russia's doctrine states that if NATO deploys tactical medium range nuclear weapons on its borders, then Russia will deploy tactical nuclear weapons targeting those facilities. But probably not on its border, but at depth, where they will survive hidden in forests. Russia's Oreshnik nuclear response will hit Germany and the USA, probably destroying military command and control in USA. The Russian terms for cessation will certainly include delivery of all personnel involved to Russia for trial and punishment.

Second, the laws of war require proportionality, no matter what weapons are used. That includes nuclear weapons. If NATO involved itself in an aggression against Russia and found itself losing (a near certainty), it is not entitled to use such a disproportionate weapon. Once again, it would constitute a war crime.

Third, Russia's air defense are best in the world, and multiple tactical nuclear weapons would have to be launched to ensure one nuclear armed glide bomb, cruise missile, or ballistic missile 'leaks' through. Together, such a mass attack with nuclear weapons would constitute a strategic nuclear strike. This would precipitate a strategic nuclear strike on USA by Russia's submarines (accepting that the land-based launch silos of the Sarmat ICBM, which launches the unstoppable nuclear armed Avangard glide vehicles, are destroyed).

Fourth, the Russian hypersonic weapons are capable of carrying a nuclear payload. They are solid fueled and therefore immediately fireable. And they are unstoppable. They are carried on road mobile vehicles and hard to locate. There will always be the possibility of a response in kind with either conventional weapons of tactical nuclear equivalence (most likely), or, unlikely, tactical nuclear weapons. Once again, this is without mentioning Russian submarines.

Fifth, the only possible response to the threat of a preemptive nuclear strike by USA is, of course a preemptive strike on the USA. Russian elites, unlike the American elites, are not barbarians. They would probably preemptively destroy some of the USA strategic nuclear missile installations as a demonstration - using conventional hypersonic Oreshnik.

Sixth, if the USA did explode a tactical nuclear weapon on a military target on Russian territory, Russia would almost certainly destroy the platform that carried out the strike, destroy the command that ordered it, and destroy the military commanders involved. This makes such a strike unattractive to those who are told by the US 'elite' politicians to carry it out. They may well decide to refuse to carry out the order (and also see point one in this regard).

Seventh, if USA exploded a tactical nuclear weapon on Russian territory, and Russia made a convincing response, that made it obvious that damage to America would be unbearable unless America came to terms, the terms would have to include some uncontaminated American territory to compensate for the land America contaminated with nuclear fallout.

Subs with Nukes
Russia can't do much about the USA sophisticated submarine fleet - except boost coastal missile defense systems. But then, USA can't do much about Russia's equally sophisticated submarine fleet.

And no current US coastal anti-missile defense system can stop the hypersonic missiles that the Russian subs carry. Let alone the nuclear drones that can be placed on the sealine of the USA east coast. Awaiting instructions. That's the difference.

Russia's 'Big Picture' Security Interests Edited 2 January 2024

Russia is more interested in a 'big picture' treaty that takes in all security systems, conventional and strategic. But the USA and west has destroyed the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, crippling it with various devious devices to render it useless, until finally Russia recognised the reality that it is a 'dead letter' and withdrew from the long-dead instrument.

"As a reminder, the treaty was signed in 1990 between the members of the Warsaw Treaty and the NATO countries, to establish a balance of forces between the members of these military and political unions at lowered levels, and to restrict the deployment of their conventional weapons along the contact line.

However, subsequent events – dissolution of the Warsaw Treaty and the Soviet Union, new conflicts on our territory and the consequential expansion of NATO to the east – prompted the adaptation of the CFE to the new circumstances.

At Russia’s insistence, the Agreement on Adaptation of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe was signed on November 19, 1999, in Istanbul, to never commence due to the destructive position of the Western countries that declined its ratification and continued bypassing the restrictions under the initial CFE by expanding the alliance.

In these conditions, Russia suspended the implementation of its CFE obligations in 2007 but left the door open for reviving conventional arms control in Europe.

The Western countries have had more than enough time to show common sense – and yet, they chose confrontation with Russia, which was reflected in NATO’s new strategic concept, among other things, not to mention the entirety of their hostile actions against our country, including the pumping of weapons and military equipment to the Kiev regime.

As emphasised in Russia’s notices, a safe and stable balance of conventional arms in the north of Europe has been seriously undermined by the recent accession to NATO of Finland, a non-CFE country that borders Russian territory which is regulated by the CFE, and the prospects of deploying conventional arms of third countries in Finland, along with the ongoing accession of Sweden, also not a CFE member. These steps were the last straw that prompted the Russian Federation to finally exit the treaty."
Foreign Ministry statement 9 June 2023

It is obvious that the USA is still trying to unilaterally reach a position of dominance over Russia. The attempt to overthrow the government by wrecking the Russian economy and instigating an armed conflict that they hoped would drag out and be Russia's 'Vietnam' was primarily about weakening Russia enough to be able to force Russia to place limits on Russia's hypersonic weapons - or abandon them altogether. Of course there are several other objectives, mainly designed to help USA business. The economic blockade was not about Ukraine, and never has been. See my article 'The West's Apartheid International Trading System'.

The US is very afraid of Russia's manouevering nuclear-capable hypersonic missiles, and rightly so. And now they are even more afraid of the non-nuclear hypersonic Oreshnik ballistic system, because no current anti-missile defenses can stop it, and the US does not yet have the technology to make their own version. But instead of choosing the path of mature and sober dialogue, it chose the path of coercion, from a proxy armed attack on Russian military right down to petty little 'petty apartheid' actions against Russian official and sportspeople.

Russia's strategic patience and seemingly endless ability to turn the other cheek seems now to reached the limit. Reasoning with the west and USA is demonstrably futile.

Russia's security is now guaranteed. The timeclock for negotiations on arms control has been run out by the USA side. Now they must live with the consequences.

“We put forth numerous practical de-escalation and confidence-building proposals for the continent. The Alliance has disregarded all of them...

[…] We strongly recommend that the United States and NATO countries harbour no illusions that their aggressive behaviour towards nations will remain unpunished.

They should start thinking about the possibility of resuming discussions on a new architecture of European security after what they have done and intend to do. […]

We urge our colleagues to sober up and to ask themselves how they can implement the political obligations on the indivisibility of security in Europe, which they adopted at the top level during the OSCE summits in 1999 and 2010."
Maria Zakharova, Russian Foreign Ministry Spokeswoman 28 April 2022

"The situation in the field of arms control continues to get worse, due to the destabilising policies and destructive actions of the United States. At the same time, the Americans are deliberately adding to the tension in the field of international security. These inseparably interlinked processes enrich one another.
As for the methods they use, the Americans opt either to dismantle contractual frameworks by withdrawing from them, as was the case with the ABM, INF and Open Skies treaties, or create conditions which make it impossible for the other side to fulfil their obligations. This is what happened with the CFE Treaty and the New START.

Washington follows a simple logic. The very foundations of US dominance are crumbling, which is largely attributable to the blunders of the Americans themselves, so confident were they in their exceptional nature, their infallibility and impunity.

They placed their bets on force in an attempt to slow down the erosion of their hegemony. This is why they have been seeking to secure their military supremacy and have a free hand to use force. And this is how we can explain their refusal to accept any restrictions in terms of arms control or other instruments for ensuring a strategic balance of interests among international actors.

Let me share just one example with you: the United States used a far-fetched pretext for dismantling the INF Treaty. In reality, the United States felt that it needed the missiles banned by the treaty, including against China. The restrictions became a nuisance to them, so they got rid of them without any hesitation. This step clearly had a negative bearing on regional and global security.

With the United States moving forward with its plans to deploy ground-based intermediate and shorter-range missiles in Europe and Asia-Pacific, Russia faces the increasingly urgent question of whether sticking with the moratorium on deploying similar weapons makes any sense, considering that this moratorium hinges upon the non-deployment of these US-made weapons in these regions.

As for the prospects for dialogue with the United States on the New START or reaching an agreement to replace it with another treaty, we sent a clear signal that there will be no dialogue as long as Washington continues with its anti-Russia policies.

It is obvious to us that the American proposals on launching nuclear arms control talks while keeping them separate from the negative military and political context and the dismal state of relations between Russia and the West are inadequate. We can see through what Washington is after: they want to mitigate nuclear risks to themselves while securing an advantage in terms of other military capabilities.

This approach, which the Americans refer to as compartmentalisation – a rather obscure and opaque notion, is absolutely unacceptable. It basically means that Russia is an enemy, but we want to get something from it. The fact that the United States and its allies persist with their efforts to promote escalation in and around Ukraine without hiding their intention of inflicting a strategic defeat on Russia, makes this even more unacceptable.

We do not reject the concept of arms control. That said, any eventual dialogue on ways of minimising the potential for conflict or agreement on the way we will coexist with the West in the future, would require equality and respect for Russia’s core security interests, as well as acknowledgment of the whole new geopolitical reality. There is no point in discussing this topic any further unless the United States and its allies are ready to accept this."
Sergey Lavrov 28 December 2023

“We don’t have any relationship with the US at the moment. They are at zero degrees Kelvin. And we should not unfreeze them for now...Let them come or crawl and beg for it.
And they should value it as an act of utmost generosity.
Otherwise, this is how it looks: they toss only sleaze our way, and we go, 'there, have this nuclear deal, please'.”
Dmitry Medvedev, deputy chair of the Russian National Security Council, Telegram June 2022

In other words, the Americans are not serious. They give nothing and expect everything. Do they seriously think that Russia will give them anything they want while at the same time they attack Russia with all possible means? No. The Americans are playing for time. They are playing for time to develop their own hypersonic weapons. They will succeed, but it may take years rather than months. They will only talk in an adult manner about arms control when they have finally acquired manouevering hypersonic weapons.

Russia has had enough of this nonsense.

The Horseradish Affair

"First, we see no need to use it [tactical nuclear weapons]; and second, considering this, even as a possibility, factors into lowering the threshold for the use of such weapons. This is my first point.
The second point is that we have more such nuclear weapons than NATO countries. They know about it and never stop trying to persuade us to start nuclear reduction talks. Like hell we will, right? A popular phrase. (Laughter.) Because, putting it in the dry language of economic essays, it is our competitive advantage.

As you know, we have been in talks...about deploying some of these tactical nuclear weapons to Belarusian territory. This has happened. The first nuclear warheads have been delivered to Belarus, but only the first batch. There will be more. By...the end of this year, we will complete this work.

This is an element of deterrence, so that everyone who thinks of inflicting a strategic defeat on us should keep this circumstance in mind."
Vladimir Putin 16 June 2023

Finally, the Russian President (who is the Chairman of the Russian National Security Council) gave a similar signal, in an ambiguous street-talk reference to a Russian double entendre - the horseradish. Apparently, as the horseradish looks like a penis, the phrase the President used means something like "let him have the horseradish", in other words "he can get fucked".

From the Russian point of view, the door is always open to negations to arms control - there are still talks ongoing between US and Russian technical experts. But the US stuffs the talks with so many pre-conditions and attempts at keeping and expanding existing one-sided advantages that it is obvious that no progress is possible. At least, as the Russians put it, 'at this stage of historic development'.

The US will simply be frozen out until they are ready to act responsibility. The United States has wavered back and forth about whether they want talks on strategic stability or not. personally, I think they were waiting for three things - first, for Russia to collapse under the privations of the economic blockade. That failed. Second, for the maximum weakening of the Russian military potential under the west's proxy war against Russia. That also failed (although as of 15 December 2024 they continue to feed Ukrainian bodies into the furnace of war, even although they know it is hopeless).

"the issue of creating a legal framework for international security and strategic stability is still on our to-do list.

Should these be new agreements or should we return to the old ones?

This is up to the experts to decide. You know, even when I was studying at the university, I did not study public international law, I studied private international law and my thesis was about it. Then, I did economics.
But it is not even about ... the formal, or the legal aspect, but about the root of the matters that we should address as a team.

We have articulated our proposals. I mentioned [them] when I spoke before the Foreign Ministry’s senior officials. As a matter of fact, it was put on paper. But there must be goodwill on the part of those who are interested in seeing this happen.

We sometimes hear from the United States that they are willing to resume talks on this subject. But they appear to be undecided. At some point they seem to want it, next thing you know they do not. During the latter stint of President Obama’s administration, they let us know that they wanted to, but then all of a sudden they changed their mind.
Vladimir Putin 4 July 2024

At some point they will want to resume talks. But that time is not now, and therefore, regrettably, the time for arms control is not now.

Index
The time has not come - reason why nuclear arms control negotiations are not yet ripe, Vladimir Kozin

Anti Ballistic Missile Treaty

Defeat of NATO military forces

Defeat of US missile shield on Russia's border

Defeat of the US attempt to destroy the strategic nuclear balance

Horseradish

Missiles, difference between short and medium range missiles and intercontinental ballistic missiles

Nuclear warheads have been delivered to Belarus

Nuclear weapons in Belarus are an element of deterrence

Nuclear weapons, Russian superiority, competitive advantage

Relations with USA at zero degrees Kelvin

Security interests, Russia, long term

Strategic Arms Limitations talks, impossible while USA is an aggressor

START Treaty, replacement of

The problem of 'too close' - how far from Russia's border do hostile nations antiballistic missiles need to be?

Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, NATO destruction of and subsequence Russian denouncement

Laurie Meadows articles on Security